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A political candidate is the person who strives to win political offices, essentially
through electoral procedures. The word originates from the Latin candidatus, “man in
white,” referring to the white robe (toga) that Romans standing for a public office used
to wear, which symbolized the untarnished moral qualities that were considered to be
the indispensable characteristics of a political man.
David Easton’s analytical framework (1965) offers the best way to approach the sub-
ject. The “candidate” can be located in the fragile interconnection point that joins the
flow of demands and support from the environment to the political system. Before their
(first) candidacy, all candidates are part of the political community. Then, as candi-
dates, they play the role of input carriers. They are messengers carrying demands, who
strive for the support of the voters and of the political community at large. Finally, if
elected, they form part of the authorities who convert demands into outputs, that is,
who make legally binding decisions. The input–output process involves some proce-
dures and some “rules of the game” that, according to Easton, are part of the regime and
regulate the processes leading to a member of the political community being selected as
a candidate and, if elected, becoming part of the authorities.
Selection
As long as political parties live and work, they will play a role in the selection processes
of the candidates in all representative democracies. However, the role parties decide
to play could depend on the electoral system which, to some extent, influences how
much the larger public will be involved. There are, in fact, considerable differences in
the incentives parties face if they are dealing with candidates’ selection processes in
single-member districts or if they are selecting names to fill long party lists. It is also
well known that the voters’ engagement in the choice of single elective positions is more
significant than in the choice of representatives to form a large assembly. Yet, the role
the electorate can play is mediated and limited by the parties’ choices. Apart from cases
of independent candidates, who stand in an election on their own without having been
nominated by a political party nor receiving its support, the role party organizations
play is that of gate-keepers. The inclusiveness or the exclusiveness of candidates’ selec-
tion processes is in the parties’ hands, which means that, apart from countries where
the procedures to select the candidates are defined by law (e.g., in the United States or in
Argentina, where primaries aremandatory), parties can autonomously decide the inclu-
siveness of the selectorate, the set of people whowill enjoy the right and power to choose
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a candidate for public office.The role of deciding who selects the candidates makes par-
ties the central actors in the democratic game of submitting them to the scrutiny and
evaluation of the citizens.
If the composition of the selectorate corresponds to the set of people who enjoy
the right to vote in an election, then the selectorate coincides with the electorate. A
good graphical representation of the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the selectorate is
presented by Rahat and Hazan (2001), who draw a continuum along which the various
selection methods are identified (Figure 1).
At one extreme, the selectorate is the most exclusive and candidates are nominated
by party leaders. This selection method is even more exclusive when party leaders are
themselves not selected, as is the case in personalist parties like Berlusconi’s Forza Italia.
This selection process combines well with a proportional system with closed party lists,
even if it is not always the case, since some parties set up (open, semi-open, or closed)
primaries for the formation of the lists. When candidates are first nominated by a lim-
ited number of party leaders and then elected in closed party lists, their most valued
quality is loyalty. They do not need to be brilliant, charismatic, or to develop leadership
and communication skills. They are simply required to follow party directives so as to
maximize party strategic cohesion in government or in opposition to the governing
party.
At the other extreme, the selectorate is the most inclusive when the entire
electorate—all those who have the right to vote in elections—can also take part in the
selection process. This is the case of the so-called blanket primaries in some US States.
Obviously, whenever the selectorate grows in number and inclusiveness, individual
characteristics become more and more important in order to be nominated, elected,
renominated, and reelected. Being a good communicator is essential, as well as gaining
a leadership position and being able to take advantage of the possibilities given by
different media and communications instruments. Party loyalty will not be of any value
and the capacity to stand up with the purpose of gaining citizens’ and party approval
will secure nomination.
In between, there are several intermediate selection methods. For example, “closed
primaries,” which require a previous registration as party member, are located toward
the inclusive end of the continuum. Since the selectorate is smaller and (pre)selected
(they are, in fact, party members), a certain amount of party discipline is required. The
selectorate can bemore or less inclusive “according to the restrictions on partymember-
ship, the additional requirements that are placed on members with a conditional right
to take part in the party selectorate, and the level of accessibility of the selector to the
selection procedure” (Rahat & Hazan, 2001, p. 302). However, as far as the selectorate
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Figure 1 Selectorate inclusiveness/exclusiveness.
Source: Rahat & Hazan, 2001, p. 301.
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approaches the electorate and there are few offices to be filled, individual characteris-
tics and communications skills become more and more important. Finally, candidates
can also be chosen by selected or nonselected party agencies, in a form of cooption val-
idated by party members. Inside each party, the relative size of each agency is a sign
of its inclusiveness: Conventions, central committees, bureaus, or other party executive
bodies can be more inclusive or less inclusive, containing either delegates selected by
party members or only representatives selected by such delegates.
The process of proposing and selecting candidates can also be multistage. This is
the case of British parties, where small executive party agencies compile a list of cen-
trally approved candidates from which the local constituency memberships can then
choose. Multistage procedures often involve decentralization. Decentralization may be
territorial or functional. The selection is functionally decentralized when parties allo-
cate positions for candidates selected formally as representatives of social groups or
sectors such as trade unions, women, minorities, etc. Frequently, to ensure functional
representation, mechanisms of reserved places or quotas are used. Territorially, the
selection is centralized when candidates are chosen by a national selectorate (which
can be inclusive or exclusive as defined above). On the contrary, the process is decen-
tralized when local selectorates nominate party candidates to run in local districts, as
in many American primaries, or when local quotas are guaranteed in party lists. The
literature argues that parties in decentralized countries reproduce the territorial decen-
tralization by adopting more inclusive and decentralized selection processes, whereas
parties in unitary countries tend to use more centralized and exclusive selection meth-
ods (Lundell, 2004). However, if the final decision remains in the hands of a few central
party officers, who can veto local decisions, decentralization does not play an incisive
role. This could have the effect of blocking popular candidacies that might have had a
chance among party members, but also of promoting party cohesion besides personal-
ization.
The inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the selectorate has some important implications.
Different selection procedures can bring specific consequences on the legitimization
of candidates and, therefore, on their behavior in the legislature, toward their parties,
and toward their constituencies. But they can also impact upon the style of candidates’
campaigns.
Framing the issue within the principal–agent theory helps explain some implica-
tions. Candidates who are chosen by an inclusive selectorate, such as in American open
primaries or when voters have a say in the final ranking of candidates in the lists, owe
their loyalty to their selectors, and not only to their party. In some cases, the political
career of the (elected) candidates, and therefore their (re)nomination, does not depend
on their loyalty to party leaders, but, on the contrary, on their ability to stand up and
to be appreciated and recognized by their inclusive selectorate. Thus, a more inclusive
selection process gives candidates a double source of legitimacy: from the party and
from “the people.” But this increased “popular” legitimacy can trigger a tendency in
the candidate to act independently, in a manner that largely disregards party strate-
gic choices and follows the unstable climate of opinion of an amorphous group known
merely as “the voters” (i.e., the selectorate). In short, when the selection procedure is
inclusive, the (narrower) candidate’s interest can overcome the (more general) party
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interest in an attempt to please the (even wider) numerous, divergent, and maybe con-
flicting voters’ interests. In addition, without sufficient party discipline, the legislative
process can turn out to be fragmented. A number of studies have tried to examine the
effects of candidate selection processes on the behavior of the legislators. For example,
selection by national party leader(s) is hypothesized to encourage legislators to behave
in a party-centeredmanner and thus to follow party disciplinemore rigorously (Bowler,
Farrell, & Katz, 1999).
This is evident also during the electoral campaign.The literature draws a line between
the candidate-centeredAmerican campaigns and the party-centeredWestern European
campaigns (Plasser & Plasser, 2002). In the United States, candidates “hire a campaign
manager and campaign staff, they identify their own campaign message, do their own
polling, and recruit and organise volunteers in the grass-roots campaign” (Karlsen &
Narud, 2013, p. 84), and, therefore, they are the source of any and all political commu-
nication, while in Western Europe the party is the campaign manager and individual
candidates are part of the party’s campaign organization. However, the extent that can-
didates campaign independently from the party with candidate-centered organization,
message, agenda, and instruments differs also among Western European democracies,
due mainly to candidates’ selection methods. According to Karlsen and Narud (2013),
the process throughwhich candidates are selected is the best predictor in explaining dif-
ferences between countries concerning the extent of individual candidate campaigning.
Campaign styles are linked to the selection method level of inclusiveness and level of
decentralization. In general, if the party controls the nomination, candidates’ campaign
style will be party-centered, while if voters control the nomination, campaign style will
be candidate-centered (but this depends also on the type of electoral system and the
form of government, see below). As far as the level of decentralization is concerned,
if the selectorate is broad and inclusive, the decentralized choice of candidates reduces
the possibility of national campaigns based on the personality of national leaders. How-
ever, if parties are divided in more or less organized factions, it is still possible that the
central faction leaders replace local candidates during the campaign, thus transforming
the struggle for nomination into something like an all-out electoral campaign. Further-
more, an inclusive candidates’ selection procedure can also foster the influence of the
mass media on politics in general and on the candidate selection process in particular.
As a consequence, it can increase the need to enhance financial resources in order to
reach a wide selectorate.
Election
Sartori argues that electoral systems are “the most specific manipulative instrument of
politics” (1968, p. 273) due to their effects on party systems and, which is more impor-
tant here, due to the limits and incentives they offer to voters, candidate, and parties.
The role a candidate can play in his/her election or reelection decisively depends on
the electoral system. Electoral systems can be classified according to several variables:
district magnitude, type of vote, electoral formula, etc. The electoral formula—how
votes are converted into seats—affects candidates’ incentives to campaign on a personal
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rather than a party fashion. For example, it is widely acknowledged that, even if not
all candidates and parties pursue the same strategy within a given electoral system,
single-member plurality systems favor the development of candidate-centered electoral
campaigns, while in closed-list proportional systems campaigns are party-centered.
Electoral rules shape the extent to which individual politicians can benefit electorally
by developing personal reputations distinct from those of their party and, sometimes,
even by taking positions or actions other than those that would most benefit their
party collectively.
Carey and Shugart (1995) have proposed a ranking of electoral systems according
to the value of personal reputation based mainly on four variables. First, the degree
of control party leaders exercise over candidates’ selection or over ballot rank in list
systems. “When leaders exercise strong ballot control, the incentive for a politician to
cultivate a personal reputation is minimized; but when ballot control is weak, personal
reputation is more valuable” (p. 421). Second, candidates can be elected in closed party
lists, through preferences in party lists, or solely on the votes they earn individually
(such as in plurality systems). If the votes cast for a candidate of a given party also
contribute to the number of seats won in the district by the party as a whole (as in list
systems) “a candidate’s fortunes depend on the ability of her entire party to attract votes.
The party reputation, then, is at a premium relative to personal reputation” (p. 421). If,
on the contrary, all candidates are elected entirely by virtue of their personal ability to
attract votes (as in single nontransferable vote or in systems that use primary elections),
“the value of personal reputation is at its greatest relative to the collective reputation of
the party” (p. 422).
Third, the number and types of votes cast—a single vote for a party, multiple votes,
or a single vote for a candidate—can also influence the value of personal reputation.
In the first case, typical of closed-list systems, voters simply choose a party and thus
there is relatively little incentive for candidates to cultivate a personal vote through a
candidate-centered campaign. If voters are allowed to cast multiple votes simultane-
ously (either within party lists, across parties, or in an ordinal system) or over time (as
when primaries are used or in a two-round system), politicians’ “personal reputation is
more valuable than when votes are cast only for parties. However, when multiple votes
are cast, personal reputation is not as overwhelmingly important relative to party rep-
utation as when all candidates are competing simultaneously for the same indivisible
support of each voter” (p. 422). In two-round systems, for example, candidates must
have some incentives to cultivate personal votes but without differentiating too much
from each other. In the second round they must broaden their appeals beyond the base
that their party reputation brings them. In the single transferable vote as well as in the
alternative vote, the ability of a candidate to be elected depends largely on how many
personal votes he/she receives, since party labels are mainly an indication for voters to
cast second and third preferences among lesser known candidates. However, since can-
didates and parties desire to conquer the second and third preferences of the voters,
they are encouraged to moderate their positions. When each voter casts one vote for
only one candidate, such as in open-list PR, alternative vote, or single nontransferable
vote, “intra-party competition takes place simultaneously with interparty competition.
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[… ] Everyone competes against everyone else at once. Under these conditions, per-
sonal reputation is at a premium relative to party reputation” (p. 422).Thus, if there are
multiple candidates per party per district, candidates must adopt some degree of per-
sonalized campaign as an electoral strategy to differentiate themselves and be elected.
They will develop their own political communication.
Finally, the effect of district magnitude depends on the degree of control party lead-
ers exercise over the selection of candidates or over ballot rank. Generally speaking, an
increase in district magnitude corresponds to a decrease in the personalization of the
campaigns. The existence of large districts increases the emphasis on party leadership
and policy position and reduces the incentive for candidates to engage in an intense per-
sonal campaign. However, in systems where there is intraparty competition and voters
have a say in the selection of candidates, as district magnitude increases, so does the
value of personal reputation. Conversely, in systems without intraparty competition, as
district magnitude increases, so the value of personal reputation decreases.
Following Bowler and Farrell’s (2011) conceptual distinction between campaigning
(i.e., campaign style) and electioneering (i.e., using campaign tools, such as those iden-
tified inNorris’s (2000) taxonomy), numerous studies have shown that there is nomean-
ingful relation between electoral systems and electioneering. The effects of electoral
institutions on the extent to which candidates use premodern, modern, and postmod-
ern campaign activities and communication tools are negligible. On the contrary, the
effect of electoral institutions is more evident in campaigning.
Empirically, thismeans that in plurality systems, where voters can cast their ballots in
favor of one candidate in single-member districts and where the relationship between
voters and candidates is direct and accountability mechanisms are clear, the role candi-
dates can play is more significant than in other systems. Their personality traits, their
behavior and, last but not at all least, their communication skills, are fundamental in
improving the probability of being elected. Thus, electoral institutions that encourage
candidates to cultivate a personal vote are associated with higher levels of campaign
personalization (Swanson & Mancini, 1996).
Of course, the role candidates play in the electoral process depends on a number of
other features of the political system.This is evident comparing the role of candidates in
the United States and in the United Kingdom. In both countries, in fact, national elec-
tions are structured around a plurality system in single-member districts and citizens
expect their representatives to protect and promote constituency interests. However,
candidates to the US Congress, especially those in marginal seats, devote muchmore of
their time and resources to constituency service than their British colleagues, with the
goal of being better known, more favorably evaluated, and, therefore, of securing their
(re)election. “Although there are numerous similarities between the two countries, the
differences are clear. [… ]TheAmerican party and electoral systems lead to greater pay-
offs for constituency service for congressmen than the corresponding British systems
allow for MPs” (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987, p. 214).
The reasons are quite straightforward. First, despite the same electoral formula, the
two countries have different forms of state and this implies a divergent understanding of
representation (more territorially centered in theUnited States than in theUnitedKing-
dom). Second, the dissimilar form of government plays a central role. The American
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system of “separate institutions sharing powers” does not favor the cohesion required
from MPs in the UK parliamentary system, in which the government needs a strong
and disciplined majority to get its laws approved. On the contrary, the American presi-
dential system, with one of the two Chambers representing the States of the federation,
does not require the same cohesive behavior from the Congressmen. This feature has
a clear bearing on campaign style, which will be more party-centered in parliamentary
systems, where the executive depends on party discipline in the legislature. Linked to
the model of government, the structuring and rooting of national parties influence the
role candidates can play in their campaign. Not surprisingly, in fact, party affiliations
affect the reputation of representatives more in the United Kingdom than in the United
States and, decisively, evaluations of national leaders affect much more the behavior
of British than American voters, since in the United Kingdom party leaders exercise a
much tighter control over the selection of candidates.
At the other extreme of the continuum, the role a candidate can play is minimum
under closed-list proportional representation. In proportional systems, in fact, themost
important elements affecting the role of candidates in the electoral process are dis-
trict magnitude and the voters’ power through preferential voting (open vs. closed).
In closed party lists, although using personal resources is potentially of electoral value
to the party, individual candidates may wish to free ride on the activities of fellow party
members since they will not personally enjoy all the benefits of their own efforts. How-
ever, even if there are fewer incentives to conduct a personal campaign, candidates are
encouraged to campaign in order to maximize party seats and thus their chance to be
elected.When, on the contrary, preferential voting is allowed, there is more uncertainty
surrounding the electoral outcome and thus candidates are encouraged to use their
personal resources, campaign skills, and communications strategies to attract the votes
necessary to be elected.
Germany represents a good case to analyze and evaluate these statements. Half of its
parliamentarians are elected from single-member districts and the remaining half are
elected from party lists through a proportional system. Although comparing the behav-
ior of candidates elected from party lists with those elected from districts is not a simple
matter due to confounding factors, Fishel (1972) shows that district candidates employ
more personal resources and engage in a more passionate electoral campaign than can-
didates in the proportional part. Zittel and Gschwend (2008) confirm the tendency of
German single-member district candidates to campaign “in a fairly independent fash-
ion from the party they represent,” which means actively seeking “a personal vote on
the basis of a candidate-centred organization, a candidate-centred campaign agenda
and candidate-centred means of campaigning” (p. 980).
Selection and election
The interplay between candidates’ selection methods and electoral systems is highly
significant. There are many aspects of an electoral system that can influence the selec-
tion of candidates. For example, it has been argued that countries with a small district
magnitude are associated with more inclusive and decentralized selection processes
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while countries with a larger district magnitude tend to adopt more exclusive and cen-
tralized selection procedures. Using a classification of the electoral formulae instead
of district magnitudes, Shomer (2014) finds that parties in open-list proportional sys-
tems, alternative vote, and single transferable vote, usemore inclusive and decentralized
selection processes compared to parties in closed-list proportional systems, while par-
ties in plurality systems and in mixed-member systems do not systematically differ in
their selection processes from those under closed-list proportional systems,wheremore
exclusive and centralized selection procedures are employed.
Political science has also established some basic tenets on the relative importance
of candidates’ role and campaign style under various selection schemes and electoral
systems. The interaction between selection methods and electoral systems has several
consequences for campaign style. It is generally acknowledged that voters’ influence
on nomination, plurality systems, and preferential voting increases the value of per-
sonal traits and the level of individualized campaigning, while a party-centered cam-
paign style is more common in systems where the party controls the nomination and
in proportional systems without preferences. According to Karlsen and Narud (2013),
besides the general distinction between party-centered and candidate-centered cam-
paigns, evenwhen the party nominates candidate selection the electoral system adopted
can make a difference. In a plurality system with party nomination, the campaign will
be party-centered with a candidate focus, while in proportional systems when the party
nominates and there is no preference voting, the campaign will be fully party-centered.
On the contrary, when the party nominates but voters can express one or more prefer-
ences, campaign style will be party-centered but with elements of individual focus.
The relative importance of personal voting in securing a politician’s career has some
important consequences on the functioning of Easton’s political system. Candidates
who believe themselves to be responsible for their own electoral fate and who are able
to secure their reelection are less dependent on the success of their executives and less
controlled by their party leaders.Thus they are less likely to accept government practices
and institutions which deny them the means to exercise individual influence than are
candidates whose fate lies in the hands of the national party or in its leadership. Obvi-
ously, this will have an impact also on legislative behavior (personalized representatives
are less disciplined and more difficult to control) and on the relationship between the
legislative and the executive (limited party loyalty and scarce party cohesion make the
role of government even more difficult). By and large, in parliamentary systems, where
the executive depends on parliamentary confidence, party cohesion is more important,
and personal reputation thereby less important, than in presidential systems, where the
origin and survival of the executive are independent from parliament and where, above
all in theUnited States, the President and all Congressmen are in charge of their political
communication strategy and practices.
SEE ALSO: Image, Political; Leadership, Political; Mass Communication; Political
Communication; Propaganda
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